Beasterfield v. Del Bosque

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

JESSICA BEASTERFIELD, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

RAYMOND DEL BOSQUE, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0046 FC
FILED 12-23-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2024-000532
The Honorable Melissa Zabor, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART

COUNSEL

Defenders of Children, Phoenix
By Donna Berlinski
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Modern Law PLLC, Peoria
By Kylie Bigelow
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David B. Gass and Judge Andrew J. Becke joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Raymond Del Bosque (“Father”) appeals from several rulings
in the superior court’s decree of dissolution. For the reasons stated below,
we vacate and remand for reconsideration of the spousal maintenance
award and child support orders. We affirm the supervised parenting time
ruling and the award of attorneys’ fees to Jessica Beasterfield (“Mother”).

BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Mother married in 2014 and have one child, who
was born later that year. The parties separated in 2017 or 2018. Mother, her
parents, and the child have lived together for most of the child’s life. The
child has multiple medical and physical disabilities. Since at least mid-2023,
Father has paid Mother $600 each month.

¶3 Mother petitioned for dissolution in January 2024 and
requested temporary orders. After a hearing, the superior court issued
temporary orders awarding sole legal decision-making authority to Mother
and supervised parenting time up to twice a week for two hours each time
to Father. Mother, or one of her family members, was to supervise one
weekly visit at her home or in public, and the second visit was to take place
with a professional supervisor agency. The court ordered the parties to split
the cost of the professional supervisor equally. The court did not order any
temporary financial support.

¶4 After a trial, the superior court awarded the parties joint legal
decision-making authority with Mother having final say if the parties could
not agree. The court found it was in the child’s best interests to continue
Father’s supervised parenting time but increased it up to three hours twice
a week. All parenting time was to be supervised by an agency able to assist
with the child’s special needs at Father’s sole expense. The court also found
Mother was entitled to a spousal maintenance award of $1,650 per month
for 60 months. The court declined to attribute income to Mother, finding
she needed to care for the child and thus calculated the $679 monthly child

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support order based on Father’s monthly income of $6,141.50. Despite
Father’s prior monthly payments of $600, the court found that Father owed
$9,380 in past child support. Finally, the court awarded Mother $5,000 in
attorneys’ fees based on the financial disparity between the parties and
Father’s unreasonableness. Father timely appealed, and we have
jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Supervised Parenting Time

¶5 We review parenting time orders for an abuse of discretion.
Christopher K v. Markaa S., 233 Ariz. 297, 300, ¶ 15 (App. 2013). Father argues
the evidence does not support the supervised parenting time order because
there was no showing unsupervised parenting time would endanger the
child. We disagree.

¶6 The child has physical disabilities that impact his ability to
communicate, eat, and perform routine tasks. He also has seizures and
must take several daily medications. The child also participates in various
therapies in medical facilities and at home.

¶7 The record shows Father had not recently spent time alone
with the child and had limited experience with the child’s therapies and
administering medications. Because of the child’s significant health issues,
under the temporary orders Father could spend two hours a week with the
child at Mother’s home, but always in Mother’s or one of her family
member’s presence. Father could also “have up to two hours of supervised
parenting time at an agency.” However, Father did not exercise supervised
parenting time outside Mother’s presence, which would have allowed him
to show his ability to care for the child independently. Instead, Father said
he could not afford to exercise parenting time with an agency, but the
superior court rejected that contention, noting that Father provided no
supporting evidence, especially in light of Mother’s obligation to pay half
the cost.

¶8 And contrary to Father’s contention, the court considered his
efforts to take parenting classes aimed at parents of special needs children.
Even so, Father told Mother his classes did not cover all the skills he needed
to care for the child. Furthermore, Mother believed Father was not fully
engaged when he appeared online for some of the therapy sessions. He
was listening and not observing the sessions and therefore could not see
how to replicate the therapies at home. The court did not abuse its
discretion in rejecting Father’s claim that he could not afford the supervised

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parenting time costs. We defer to the superior court’s weighing of evidence
and witness credibility determinations and do not reweigh conflicting
evidence on appeal. See Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 16 (App. 2009); see
also Aries v. Palmer Johnson, Inc., 153 Ariz. 250, 261 (App. 1987) (“The trial
court is not bound to accept as true the uncontradicted testimony of an
interested party.”).

¶9 The record supports the court’s conclusion that Father, while
making some effort to improve his caregiving skills, still presented a danger
to the child’s physical, mental, moral, or emotional health that warranted
supervised parenting time. See A.R.S. §§ 25-403.01(D); -403.02(D). Father
has not shown the court abused its discretion.

II. Child Support

¶10 Father argues the court erred by attributing no income to
Mother in the child support calculation and by inflating his income. We
review child support awards for an abuse of discretion and accept the
superior courts’ findings of fact absent clear error. Hoobler v. Hoobler, 254
Ariz. 130, 140, ¶ 22 (App. 2022). “We review de novo the trial court’s
interpretation of the [Child Support] Guidelines.” Engel v. Landman, 221
Ariz. 504, 510, ¶ 21 (App. 2009).

A. Mother’s Income

¶11 The child support calculation is based on each parent’s gross
income and includes income from any source. A.R.S. § 25-320, appx., Child
Support Guidelines (“Guidelines”) § II.A.1.b; Hoobler, 254 Ariz. at 140, ¶ 23.
“The gross income calculation accounts for ‘all aspects of a parent's income
to ensure the award is just and based on the total financial resources of the
parents.’” Hoobler, 254 Ariz. at 140, ¶ 24 (citation and quotation omitted).
The superior court attributed no income to Mother, but the evidence does
not support this finding.

¶12 For two years, Mother worked a seasonal, part-time job
earning $17 an hour. Mother testified that she could work part-time while
the child is in school. Mother’s family helps pay her expenses, and her
financial affidavit included $695 as monthly income from “contributions to
household living expense[s] by others.”

¶13 The court disregarded Mother’s actual income altogether,
finding Mother’s “ability to work is hampered by the hours she can work
and the need to care for their child.” Mother’s testimony refutes the finding
that Mother cannot or has not worked at all.

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¶14 Mother argues the Guidelines allow the court to decline to
attribute income to a parent when a child’s unusual emotional or physical
needs require that parent’s presence in the home. See Guidelines §
II.A.5.b.iii. That is correct, but the court failed to include Mother’s actual
income here. Mother historically worked limited hours and still provided
the necessary care for the child. Moreover, the contributions from family
members do not impact her ability to care for the child. See Cummings v.
Cummings, 182 Ariz. 383, 386 (App. 1994) (noting courts may consider
recurring cash gifts as income to a parent). The court also failed to address
the recurring support she receives from family members.

¶15 Even though the court had discretion not to attribute income
beyond a part-time, seasonal job, it was an abuse of discretion to not include
Mother’s actual income. In re Marriage of Pacific, 168 Ariz. 460, 464 (App.
1991), is distinguishable on this basis. In that case, this court upheld the
superior court’s decision not to impute full-time income to a parent who
worked reduced hours to care for a child; the superior court did not
disregard the parent’s actual part-time income. Id.

¶16 The superior court’s error in failing to attribute income to
Mother impacts the past and current child support calculations as well as
the spousal maintenance calculation. The resulting changes in the current
and past child support orders and spousal maintenance calculations are not
de minimis. Accordingly, we vacate the child support and spousal
maintenance orders and remand for reconsideration using Mother’s actual
income.

B. Father’s Income

¶17 The superior court found that Father’s income was $6,141.50
a month. Father argues the court erroneously based his income on
“non-guaranteed bonuses, holiday pay, and paid time[-]off.” He claims his
income fluctuates and a recent pay-restructuring will require him to work
overtime to maintain his current income level.

¶18 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to
upholding the superior court’s ruling and will affirm reasonable evidence
supports it. Boncoskey v. Boncoskey, 216 Ariz. 448, 451, ¶ 13 (App. 2007). The
court did not explain how it determined Father’s income. According to
Father’s financial affidavit, his income as of April 2024 was $5,969,
including variable bonuses. The letter from Father’s employer confirmed
that Father is paid hourly plus a potential bonus but offered no details.
Mother provided three of Father’s recent paystubs showing he earned

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$32,575 for the first five months of 2024, or $6,515 a month. Father regularly
worked overtime during this time.

¶19 In determining a parent’s income for child support purposes,
the court may include a parent’s overtime pay if it is part of that parent’s
regular schedule. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 29–32, ¶¶ 2, 14–15 (App.
2002). Although Father suggested that overtime is not always available, he
offered no evidence to refute the paystubs that showed his 2024ear-to-date
income, which included overtime. He also failed to show that paid time off
and holiday pay were not part of his regular compensation. The record
supports the court’s finding about Father’s income.

III. Spousal Maintenance

¶20 The superior court awarded Mother spousal maintenance of
$1,650 per month for five years. We affirm a spousal maintenance award if
there is any reasonable evidence to support it. Thomas v. Thomas, 142 Ariz.
386, 390 (App. 1984). We view the evidence in a light favoring the judgment
and may infer any findings needed to sustain the judgment if such findings
are supported by the record and do not conflict with any express findings.
Id. Although we are remanding for reconsideration of Mother’s income, we
address Father’s challenges to the spousal maintenance award that will
arise on remand.

¶21 Father argues Mother was not eligible under A.R.S.
§ 25-319(A) because she did not show she would be unable to support
herself through adequate employment. He also contends the duration was
excessive because Mother could become self-sufficient sooner.

A. Mother’s Eligibility

¶22 Under A.R.S. § 25-319(A), the superior court may award
spousal maintenance if the spouse seeking support meets any one of the
five eligibility factors. In re Marriage of Cotter, 245 Ariz. 82, 86, ¶ 10 (App.
2018). The court found that Mother (1) lacked sufficient property; (2) could
not be self-sufficient, and (3) had significantly reduced her income or career
opportunities to care for the child and could only work part-time while the
child was in school, which limited her employment options. See A.R.S.
§ 25-319(A)(1),(2), (3).

¶23 Father does not challenge the finding that Mother lacked
sufficient property. See A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(1). Because a spouse is eligible
if the court finds only one statutory factor under A.R.S. § 25-319(A), we
affirm the eligibility finding. See Cotter, 245 Ariz. at 86, ¶ 10.

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B. Duration

¶24 We reject Father’s argument that the duration was not
supported by the record. Under the Spousal Maintenance Guidelines, the
court lacks discretion to deviate from the duration range. See A.R.S.§ 25-
319, appx., Spousal Maintenance Guidelines §§ I.A (“[T]he statute does not
authorize a deviation from the duration ranges.”); I.D, Step 5 (“A court
cannot deviate from the duration ranges under Section IV.”). The court
applied the high end of the duration range. Additional findings of fact and
conclusions of law are not required if the award is within the specified
range. Id. at § I.D, Step 6. Also, neither party requested findings of fact and
conclusions of law under Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”)
82. The court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a duration within the
range.

IV. Father’s Past Voluntary Payments

¶25 According to Father, he voluntarily paid Mother $600 a month
for child support since 2021. Mother did not dispute this, and her bank
records show a $600 monthly Zelle transfer from Father from late July 2023
through February 2024. Father claims the court erred by treating this as
spousal maintenance instead of child support, which resulted in a past child
support judgment of $9,380.

¶26 If the court enters a child support order, it must calculate the
past child support owed, “taking into account any amount of temporary or
voluntary support that has been paid.” A.R.S. § 25-320(C). Although Father
claims the voluntary payments were designed as child support, he did not
provide evidence of such a designation. But Mother did not dispute the
payments.

¶27 The court made no findings about these payments. Contrary
to Father’s position on appeal, the court did not treat them as spousal
maintenance because the court calculated the past child support obligation
“based on no spousal maintenance payments to Mother by Father[.]” And
there was no order for temporary or past spousal maintenance.

¶28 The record does not indicate whether the court considered
these payments or, if so, how it treated the payments. Accordingly, we
remand for the court to consider whether to credit these payments towards
the past child support judgment. Even if the court viewed the voluntary
payments as spousal maintenance, as Father suggests, it must recalculate
the past child support order because it did not include the $600 payment as
income to Mother in calculating the past child support order.

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V. Award of Attorneys’ Fees to Mother

¶29 The superior court awarded Mother attorneys’ fees under
A.R.S. § 25-324, finding that Father has considerably more resources and
acted unreasonably. Specifically, the court noted Father’s failure to exercise
supervised parenting time, become more involved, and learn about the
child’s special needs. The court also rejected Father’s claim that he could
not afford to exercise parenting time with a supervisor. We will affirm a
fee award unless the court abused its discretion. Magee v. Magee, 206 Ariz.
589, 590, ¶6 (App. 2004).

¶30 Father erroneously contends that the court did not make
sufficient findings under A.R.S. § 25-324. Absent a request under Rule 82,
express findings are not required. Rinegar v. Rinegar, 231 Ariz. 85, 90, ¶ 20
(App. 2012) (“Because neither party requested written findings of fact or
conclusions of law, we presume that the superior court found every fact
necessary to support its ruling.”). And Mother is not required to show an
inability to pay to support an award of attorneys’ fees. See Magee, 206 Ariz.
at 591-92, 593, ¶¶ 12, 18. We defer to the court’s determination of Father’s
credibility as to the parenting time expense. See supra ¶ 9.

¶31 The record supports the court’s determination that Father
acted unreasonably and that he had more financial resources than Mother.
Therefore, we affirm the award of attorneys’ fees to Mother.

VI. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs on Appeal

¶32 Father requests an award of attorneys’ fees incurred on
appeal under A.R.S. § 25-324 due to the “financial imbalance between the
parties” and Mother’s “unreasonable defense of unsupported findings.” In
our discretion, we deny his request. But as the successful party on appeal
under A.R.S. § 12-342(A), Father is awarded taxable costs subject to
compliance with ARCAP 21.

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CONCLUSION

¶33 We vacate the spousal maintenance award and the past and
current child support orders. On remand, the court shall reconsider these
awards based on Mother’s actual income and shall address Father’s
voluntary payments. In all other respects, we affirm the decree.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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